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Abstract 
In this paper, I argue that the philosophy of science has not paid enough attention to the future of 
science. Even though the philosophy of science has deepened our understanding of science, explicit 
conceptual tools to understand the estimating of possible futures of science are missing from its 
repertoire. I argue that the philosophy of science can achieve two main objectives of the futures 
research: enhancing understanding and challenging conventional thinking. While there are 
legitimate concerns about the epistemic and ethical impossibility of predicting scientific innovations 
and discoveries, it is nevertheless possible to investigate a wide range of questions concerning the 
future of science. I sketch structural taxonomies as a tool for the estimating of possible futures of 
science. A structural taxonomy is a map of scenarios that are possible according to some 
philosophical theory of science. I show how the merits of such taxonomies can be assessed and how 
the assessment sheds new light on the existing philosophy of science. I conclude by noting that 
future-oriented thinking is highly valuable for our current understanding of science. 
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1. Introduction 
Science has changed considerably during its history. Not only have the contents, methods, goals, 
and assumptions changed but so have its technological, social, and cultural settings. Moreover, 
many, if not most, aspects of science are dependent on these settings. The technological, social and 
cultural settings are in constant flux and it seems reasonable to conjecture that the rate of 
technological, social, and cultural change will increase in the 21st century. The conclusion, that (at 
least some aspects of) science will therefore also change in the future, follows immediately. 
The philosophy of science is currently working in close connection with the sciences. In addition, 
the philosophy of science has drawn on resources from the research on the history of science. 
Despite many complications in such collaboration, it seems that we understand more and more 
about science and its development. Surprisingly, very little has been said about the estimating of 
possible futures of science (or sciences, to be exact) on the basis of our improved understanding of 
science and its development. Only fragmented lines of thoughts concerning the estimating of the 
future of science1 are present in the literature.2 While there are many reports (e.g. EU; NATO) that 
summarize possible future topics and methods in science, there has been very little reflection on 
how the future of science can be estimated. As the philosophy of science has shown, science is 
opaque and difficult to understand. Given the opaqueness, the reports concerning the future of 
science appear hopelessly simplistic without reflection on the conceptions of science that they 
embrace. The problem is that the philosophy of science has not been much of a help here. Even 
though history and the philosophy of science have deepened our understanding of science, explicit 
conceptual tools to understand the estimating of possible futures of science are missing from its 
repertoire. 
In this paper, I analyze how the philosophy of science can improve our ability to estimate the future 
of science. I proceed as follows. In §2, I motivate the estimating of the future of science by 
characterizing the basic tenets and goals of futures research and by arguing that the philosophy of 
 
1 When we estimate the future of science, we are always estimating possible futures of science (see sections 2 and 3). 
I often use “the future” for convenience. 
2 e.g. IFTF. (2006); Rescher (1999); Martin (1995); McIntyre (2007); (Popper 1957); Small et al. (2014); Tromp (2018). 
science has good prospects to be coordinated with the tenets and goals. I argue that prediction is not 
the only goal of future-oriented thinking and therefore the impossibility of predicting the future of 
science does not cut off the relevance of the philosophy of science in our future-oriented thinking. 
In §3, I focus on how the theories developed in the philosophy of science can provide theoretical 
insights on possible futures of science. I show that we can formulate taxonomies of possible futures 
of science on the basis of philosophical theories. In §4, I analyze how the merits of such taxonomies 
can be assessed. I argue that the assessment must be based on historical, normative, and practical 
considerations. I also argue that the assessment of the taxonomies enables us to shed new light on 
the philosophical theories that are the bases of the taxonomies. By unpacking the possible future 
commitments of the theories, we gain deeper knowledge concerning their nature. In §5, I conclude 
the discussion by noting how the disagreements and deep theoretical battles in the philosophy of 
science can be turned into a resource when we attempt to estimate the future of science.  
 
2. The Prospects: Enhancing Understanding and Challenging Conventional Thinking 
To motivate the philosophical study of the future of science, it is useful to begin from a tension that 
concerns the future of science. On the one hand, it is often taken for granted that the developments 
in science (or, as in pessimistic visions, the degeneration of science) will be a central driving force 
of technological, economic, social, and cultural phenomena. The future of science is too important a 
topic to be left without attention. Not only funding decisions and science policy depend on some 
estimates of how science can develop but also – and more importantly – our ability to understand 
the future of society in general. There are countless ways in which the future of science and the  
future of conceptions of science affect society: What technologies we have (e.g. EU 2019), who we 
consider as epistemic authorities (e.g. Mede & Schäfer 2020), how we perceive the human-nature 
relations (e.g. Allen 2018), and so on. Our ability to anticipate and prepare for changes in such areas 
depends on our ability to estimate the future of science.   
On the other hand, science is often considered to be essentially unpredictable. In order to tell what 
the future of science looks like we should know what theories are accepted in the future. How could 
we, even in principle, know the future theories? If anything, we know that many past theories have 
been rejected. Even when science has appeared to be complete, completely new horizons have 
arisen (Rescher 1999, 23-26). Probably the same fate awaits our theories, the argument continues. 
Moreover, the development of science should not be planned according to some presumed future, as 
there are some seriously bad experiences about cases, such as Lysenkoism, where science failed 
because its presumed future was foretold. Polanyi argued that “Any attempt at guiding scientific 
research towards a purpose other than its own is an attempt to deflect it from the advancement of 
science” (1962, 62) and Merton famously alarmed us about planning the future of science: “Science 
must not suffer itself to become the handmaiden of theology or economy or state. The function of 
this sentiment is likewise to preserve the autonomy of science. [--] In other words, as the pure 
science sentiment is eliminated, science becomes subject to the direct control of other institutional 
agencies and its place in society becomes increasingly uncertain.”. (Merton 1968, 597). 
Sir Karl Popper has provided an elegant expression of this enormous tension between the centrality 
of science in society and the difficulties and dangers in the estimating of its future: 
“The course of human history is strongly influenced by the growth of human knowledge. [However, 
we] cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future growth of our scientific knowledge. 
We cannot, therefore, predict the future course of human history.” (1957, ix-x.) 
It is important to understand the context of Popper’s statement. He is arguing against “the belief in 
historical destiny” (ibid, vii) and, more specifically, against “the possibility of a theoretical history; 
that is to say, of a historical social science that would correspond to theoretical physics. There can 
be no scientific theory of historical development serving as a basis for historical prediction” (ibid. 
x). The historical context is revealed by Popper’s dedication of the book to “victims to the fascist 
and communist belief in Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny”.  
Given the Popperian tension and given the importance of understanding the future of science, I 
suggest that we abandon the all-or-nothing approach of Popper and study to what extent and with 
what reservations the future of science can be estimated even if we cannot predict it. It is a bit 
ironic that, given the basic tenets of futures research, the ethical dangers and theoretical problems 
associated with the estimating of the future of science should not be seen as an external barrier for 
the study of the future of science. On the contrary, they are exactly the issues that the study of the 
future of science should focus on. Given the current understanding of the basic tenets and goals of 
futures research, Popper was, in fact, an early advocate of the study of the future of science. 
To see this, we can note that the two main objectives of future estimation are the following: (Wright 
et al. 2013, 631): 
A) “enhancing understanding: of the causal processes, connections and logical sequences 
underlying events — thus uncovering how a future state of the world may unfold”.  
B) “challenging conventional thinking in order to reframe perceptions and change the mindsets of 
those within organizations”. 
Given A and B, we “can provide information, ideas and stimuli to support a third objective; better 
decision making and strategic planning” (ibid.).  
Moreover, we should also note that the futures research includes an ethical component: Among the 
possible future states of the world, we should identify and steer towards those that are desirable (or 
“preferable”) (Bell 1997; Marien 2002). This topic cannot be discussed in detail in the limits of this 
paper. However, I will briefly mention some of its implications in §4. 
Given these basic tenets of the futures research, we can understand Popper and the estimating of the 
future of science in a new light. First, we should study the causal connections and processes that 
affect science and its relation to society, culture, and technology. More generally, we can study 
patterns of development of science. Popper (1957) can be understood as providing one such study 
of the patterns of development of science, as he argues that the patterns of development of science 
and society cannot be extrapolated from history and abandons the idea of straightforward lines of 
development that are grounded on nomological necessities. 
It is important to note that the futures research is not committed to studying patterns that are 
independent of human decisions. On the contrary, it is hardly possible to understand the patterns if 
one does not study the causal role of human decisions within the possible patterns of development. 
Moreover, ethical decision-making and work towards desirable futures are possible only if we 
understand the causal role of decisions within the patterns of development. The study of patterns of 
development of the future of science does not preclude decision making but makes it possible. Only 
if we understand the causal network where decisions are made, we can understand the consequences 
of those decisions and whether they enable us to achieve desirable goal. Finally, understanding 
decision-making against the background of patterns of development makes it possible to avoid 
wishful thinking and hubris. For example, sometimes we “try to ‘force’ nature into ‘boxes;' but 
nature resists” (Godfrey-Smith 2003, 177) and the consequences of the resistance can be harmful 
when the decisions do not receive an adequate reality check, like in the case of Lysenkoism. It is, of 
course, a major question how the resistance and other related issues in the development of science 
should be understood and conceptualized, as we will discuss in §3. Nevertheless, it is obvious that 
there are limitations to our ability to simply decide the future of science. 
Secondly, we should challenge conventional thinking and reframe perceptions. Popper can be 
understood as challenging what he considered as a dangerous convention among certain thinkers, 
that of attempting to predict the future of society in simplistic terms, including visions of historical 
destiny. Moreover, he reframed the possibility of predicting the future by using current knowledge 
by arguing that it is impossible to predict the future because human knowledge is growing (1957, 
x). In general, philosophers of science have questioned conventional ways of thinking about science 
or critically engaged with the basic assumption in the conventional thinking. Whether or not 
particular philosophical analyses have been correct, they have posed important questions 
concerning the workings of science. For example, it has become obvious that there are theory 
changes that cannot possibly be understood in terms of accumulation of breakthroughs and 
unproblematic continuity of knowledge. Even the most optimistic philosophers, scientific realists, 
accept this, and the question has become – for example, in the debates concerning the so-called 
divide et impera strategy – what kind of continuity, if any, there exists through theory change and 
what that continuity, or the lack of continuity thereof, tells us about the epistemic merits of 
scientific theories (see Psillos 1999, 103-109). 
These two aspects, the study of patterns and the challenging of conventional understanding, are 
often connected in the historical philosophy of science. In these studies, a philosophical theory of 
science is assessed against historical evidence. A canonical example of such a study is Laudan’s 
pessimistic metainduction which argues that there have been successful theories in the past that 
were false, and therefore we cannot infer the truth of a theory from its success. According to 
Laudan’s study, there has been a pattern of development that challenges a way of thinking: 
Successful theories have turned out to be false and we are not allowed to infer “that science works 
because it has got a grip on how things really are” (1981, 48). The historical philosophy of science 
is relevant to the estimating of futures of science since it allows us to compare, contrast and debate 
possible future changes against the causal framework of the past (Bradfield et al. 2016, 61) and to 
“to tease out conflicting viewpoints, misunderstandings and biases” (ibid. 64). even though we 
cannot predict the future of science unambiguously (see §4 below). This is exactly what Laudan 
does: “Nothing I have said here refutes the possibility in principle of a realistic epistemology of 
science. To conclude as much would be to fall prey to the same inferential prematurity with which 
many realists have rejected in principle the possibility of explaining science in a non-realist way. [--
] Given the present state of the art, it can only be wish fulfilment that gives rise to the claim that 
realism, and realism alone, explains why science works.” (1981, 48). Laudan does not claim that he 
has cut off the link between success and truth once and for all. Rather, he argues that, given what 
has happened in the past, we should be rather careful when understanding the development of 
successful science in terms of its convergence towards truth.  
In §4 we will discuss the role of historical considerations in the estimating of the future of science 
in more detail. Here we can notice that the achievement of the main objectives of the estimating of 
the future of science (i.e., enhancing understanding and challenging conventional thinking) is not 
confined to the descriptive historical philosophy of science. There are at least two approaches that 
are relevant to the objectives.  
The first one provides rational reconstructions of episodes in history of science. The question is not 
what in fact happened but what would have happened, had the development of science followed a 
particular philosophical framework. We do not compare, contrast, and debate the possible futures of 
science against the actual history but possible histories. The actual history is not ignored as it 
provides a reality check for the possible histories, but it has no direct role in teasing out conflicting 
viewpoints, misunderstandings and biases. While rational reconstructions have a reputation as parts 
of an outdated philosophy of science, in §4 we see why they are still highly relevant. 
The second one focuses on conceptual analysis. It is obvious that the analysis of conceptual 
problems at the heart of scientific results, methods, and practices is central to our ability to enhance 
understanding and challenge conventional ways of thinking. Conceptual analyses can range from “a 
description of ordinary and scientific usage and judgment” to “recommendations about what one 
ought to mean by various [--] claims”, as Woodward (2003, 7) notes. Different points in this 
continuum have different relevance with respect to our two main objectives: The more descriptive 
an analysis is, the more understanding it provides about the actual workings of (and problems 
within) science; The more normative an analysis is, the more it challenges conventional ways of 
thinking. In best cases, the normative and descriptive aspects are balanced (Woodward 2003, 7-8) 
and therefore conceptual analysis enables us to enhance understanding and challenge conventional 
ways of thinking. 
We have now seen how different types of philosophical studies can satisfy the two main objectives 
of the futures research, enhancing understanding and challenging conventional ways of thinking. 
We have also seen how these studies can tease out conflicting viewpoints, misunderstandings, and 
biases. By now it should be clear that the attempt to estimate the future of science does not carry 
with it the idea that we can simply decide or plan how the future of science will be like. On the 
contrary, we have seen that the philosophy of science can provide understanding about the possible 
consequences of and restrictions to decisions and challenge the conventional frameworks where the 
science-related decisions are made. In this way, by achieving the two main objectives of the 
estimating of the future of science, the philosophy of science could “provide information, ideas and 
stimuli to support a third objective; better decision making and strategic planning” which is the 
third objective of futures research (Wright et al. 2013, 631). 
In this section, I have argued that there are good chances that the philosophy of science can improve 
our understanding of the future of science. However, we still need to ask how the estimating of the 
future of science is possible and what are the main obstacles in the estimating. I now turn to these 
issues. 
3. Structural Taxonomies of Possible Futures of Science 
In order to understand how and to what extent we can estimate the future of science, we need to 
notice that there exists a unique3 source of difficulties in the estimating of the future of science. The 
problem is that there are strong and compelling arguments that show that if we were able to predict 
a scientific discovery or innovation, then we would have already achieved the discovery or 
innovation, which is a conradiction. There are two slightly different versions of this problem. First, 
if we are able to describe a radically new conceptual innovation of the future, we have already made 
the innovation. “Any invention, any discovery, which consists essentially in the elaboration of a 
radically new concept cannot be predicted, for a necessary part of the prediction is the present 
elaboration of the very concept whose discovery or invention was to take place only in the future. 
(Macintyre 2007, 93). Given that we will have radical conceptual innovations in the future, it 
follows that our conceptual schemas are insufficient for predicting radical conceptual innovations of 
the future. Secondly, even if we had a sufficient conceptual schema and made a prediction 
concerning a novel discovery, we would not have sufficient justification for our belief that the 
discovery will be made. If a theory T implies that some D is the case, and if we do not already 
believe that D, then we do not have enough justification for T. Once D is discovered, we might 
believe in T because D justifies it; but at this point, we can no longer predict D. (See [Finocchiaro 
1973, 37] for a similar argument.)  
 
3 I.e., a source that is not merely based our general epistemic limitations and general problems in the estimating of the 
future. 
Both arguments above rely essentially on the view that science will change in the future. They also 
assume that the most important thing to know about the future of science is what exactly will be 
known, i.e. the exact results of science. The problem is that the first claim is ambiguous and the 
second one questionable. Of course, the whole point of estimating the future of science depends on 
the view that science will change in the future. However, it is unclear how much it can change and 
why. An interesting aspect of the estimating of possible futures of science is to map how much 
science can change and for what reasons. I return to this soon. Moreover, even though it would be 
great if we knew what discoveries will be made in the future of science, it does not follow that other 
questions are futile. For example, the motivation for expensive experiments with fusion power is 
not that we are able to predict their outcome (whether or not fusion power will be commercially 
useful) but that we can estimate that there are good chances that we get an answer to our question 
(i.e., it can be expected that the experiments are good enough to inform us about the possible 
commercial use of fusion power) (see Claessens 2020, Ch. 12). Even if we cannot predict the future 
results of science, there still remain many interesting questions we can ask with respect to the future 
of science. The arguments against the possibility of estimating the future of science are therefore 
seriously limited. 
Moreover, one crucial element in the arguments against the possibility of estimating the future of 
science is the assumption that the goal of the process is to predict particular events, discoveries and 
innovations. This appears to be a way too restricted stance towards future-oriented thinking. It is 
questionable in general, and not just with respect to scientific discoveries and innovations, whether 
the accurate prediction of particular events in human society is the golden standard of successful 
futures research. Given that the main objectives of futures research are enhancing understanding 
and challenging conventional thinking, there is much more to the futures research than predicting.  
The arguments above do not prove that nothing interesting can be said about the possible futures of 
science. In fact, given the main objectives of futures research, we have reasons to think that focus 
on the predicting of particular events puts the cart before the horse. 
First, notice that the occurrence of a particular event usually depends on the surrounding context 
which makes them difficult to predict. Staley argues that “[E]vents are so dependent on individual 
actions, accident, contingency, context, and any one of countless other variables, [that] venturing a 
prediction about future events is doomed from the start” (2002, 75). Secondly, decisions affect the 
future. In order to make meaningful decisions, we have to understand the consequences of those 
decisions. This is possible only if we understand the possible contexts where the consequences of 
the decisions unfold, and these means that knowledge about the general context of the future is 
logically prior to knowledge of particular events. Given these two observations, it seems that we 
should study possible contexts (or “structures” as I will call them below) where events and 
decisions might take place in the future. 
Understanding possible future contexts can be achieved through the formulation of scenarios: “The 
goal of scenario writing is not to predict the one path the future will follow but to discern the 
possible states toward which the future might be ‘attracted.’ [--] If a prediction is a definitive 
statement of what the future will be, then scenarios are heuristic statements that explore the 
plausibilities of what might be.” (Staley 2002, 78). While there are different definitions of a 
scenario and subtle differences between the definitions, in this paper, we can consider scenario 
simply as a “description of a future situation and the course of events which allows one to move 
forward from the actual to the future situation” (Amer et al. 2013, 23). 
What kind of scenarios can the philosophy of science produce? I suggest that philosophical theories 
can be used to formulate possible structures of the future of science. I have adopted the term 
‘structures’ from Staley (2002, 88) who underlines the boundaries within which events occur and 
the contexts that produce events, but a natural inspiration for the use of the term in the philosophy 
of futures of science comes from Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions which describes the 
basic epistemic, social, and institutional factors that shape the overall development of science. So, 
by the notion of the structure of the future of science, I refer to a (possible) configuration of factors 
that produce and set boundaries for scientific development. Given that the philosophical theories of 
science formulate principles concerning the factors that produce and bound scientific developments, 
philosophical theories can be used to describe possible futures of science: Different theories 
incorporate different principles, and each theory provides one possible structure of the future of 
science. It is important to stress that the attempt is not to predict the future. Rather, the attempt is to 
formulate theoretically possible structures of the future science. These structures serve as the bases 
for more detailed pictures concerning the future that we create by adding contents to the structures. 
By the notion of content I mean the possible knowledge, methods, and institutional arrangements 
that might be adopted in the future. Once we have added some possible content to a structure, we 
have formulated a scenario of the future of science. Within a scenario, it is possible to describe 
particular events. 
By using theoretically based structures and by adding several possible contents to these structures, 
we can build structural taxonomies of possible futures of science. Let’s take some examples to 
clarify the approach. I begin with a somewhat detailed example and then move on to examples that 
are less detailed but complementary to the first one.  
(E1) In the Kuhnian philosophy of science, there are (mainly) two kinds of periods in the 
development of science: normal science and revolutionary science. A normal science period is a 
one in which a paradigm defines the research in a scientific field. A paradigm is a "universally 
recognized scientific achievement that for a time provides model problems and solutions to a 
community of practitioners" (Kuhn 1970, viii). A paradigm, then, is the condition under which 
science can develop in a steady fashion. Revolutionary science, on the other hand, is a period in 
which an existing paradigm is challenged due to its inability to solve important problems and a new 
paradigm is established. Different paradigms are mutually incommensurable, as there are no shared 
standards that enable scientists to choose between competing paradigms in the period of 
revolutionary science. Kuhn makes the point dramatically: “the proponents of competing paradigms 
practice their trades in different worlds” (1970, 150).  It is understandable, then, why a change of 
paradigm constitutes a scientific revolution.  
Kuhn’s theory defines a possible structure of the future of science. If Kuhn is right,4 whatever the 
details, science will be dominated by a paradigm and this domination will end during a revolution. 
Given this structure, we need to fill in the contents in order to create scenarios. Which paradigms 
will continue their dominance? Which paradigms are under serious doubt? What are the possible 
courses of action, given that a field of research is under doubt? For example, consider the debates 
concerning the Future Circular Collider (FCC). The debate concerns the possible discoveries and 
new knowledge created by the FCC. Sabine Hossenfelder (2020) has argued that the cost of the 
FCC is too great given the chances of possible discoveries. Michela Massimi (2020) has argued that 
the FCC can be defended once we understand scientific progress not in terms of “great” discoveries 
but in terms of excluding possibilities. This debate provides us with two sets of scenarios. The first 
set concerns whether the FCC is built or not.  The second set concerns the possible futures within 
the FCC-centered research. 
Take the first set. Given the Kuhnian picture, either the paradigm set by the research with the Large 
Hadron Collider will continue as the FCC is built (content1), or the inability to solve important 
problems leads to a decision to attempt some other approaches in physics (contents2,1–n). 
Hossenfelder gives two examples of such alternatives “high precision measurements at low energies 
 
4 And this is a big IF. Let’s assume it for the sake of illustration. 
or increasing the masses of objects in quantum states”. Notice that in the Kuhnian structure, there is 
an ambiguity whether contents2 count as revolutionary. On the one hand, contents2 would be the 
outcome of the inability to solve central issues within high-energy physics. On the other hand, the 
Hossenfelder’s suggestions stem from the current background of physics. As Toulmin (1970) 
pointed out, the absolute revolution vs. normal science distinction is too restrictive interpretive tool. 
As a consequence, the Kuhnian taxonomy involves ambiguities that need to be removed. We come 
back to this issue in the next section. 
Next, take the second set of scenarios. Hossenfelder argues that it is possible that no significant 
discoveries will be made with the FCC (content1,1). In the Kuhnian structure, the inability to solve 
problems leads to a revolution. Massimi argues that in addition to clear discoveries that are to be 
expected on the basis of current theories and methodology (content1,2) it is possible that “vain” 
experimental attempts create the ground for “a revolution similar to the one behind relativity theory 
in rethinking the theoretical foundations for a new physics” (2020) and such revolution in the 
foundations of the Standard Model is one possible content (content1,3).   
Figure 1. presents a taxonomy that is created by adapting a Kuhnian structure and the examples of 
contents taken from Hossenfelder and Massimi. The taxonomy shows how the Kuhnian structure 
classifies different futures with respect to their place in the paradigm-revolution scheme. The 
structure adds a level of interpretation of the future possibilities as it enables us “to discern the 
possible states toward which the future might be ‘attracted’” (Staley 2002, 78). Such taxonomies are 
useful because their theoretical bases are transparent and because they allow us to see at a glance 
what kind of futures are possible. Once we have side-by-side several taxonomies that differ in their 
theoretical basis, the understanding of different possible futures is enhanced even further (see 
below). Moreover, they provide a rather direct feedback loop. Given that the interpretations of 
certain contents within the structure are dubious, we are able to reflect the merits of the theory that 
serves as the basis for the structure. For example, the interpretation of contents (2,1)-(2,2) as 
revolutionary scenarios seems somewhat problematic. Moreover, contents (1,1) and (1,3) both 
constitute a scenario of revolution, but they disagree on when a revolution is possible. (1,1) says 
that mere lack of results leads to a revolution, whereas (1,3) says that revolution requires that there 





Without taking a stance with respect to the credibility of the Kuhnian structure or the specific 
suggestions on the contents, we can still see how we can formulate taxonomies of different 
scenarios about possible future of science. All contents from (1) to (2,n) provide a “description of a 
future situation and the course of events which allows one to move forward from the actual to the 
future situation”. Moreover, and more importantly, the scenarios enhance understanding and 
challenge conventional ways of thinking. For example, Massimi (2020) explicitly argues that 
“particle physics community has long stopped (if ever did) following any Popperian method of 
hypotheses-testable predictions-falsification” and the possible future of the FCC should not be 
understood in those terms. Massimi also makes an important note on the scientific revolutions: The 
direction of a revolution is not arbitrary. Rather, revolution can only change a field whose 
foundations have been examined by a long tradition of detailed research. This implies that, while 
we cannot predict the future of science because there (arguably) are fundamental changes, it does 
not follow that the possible changes cannot be narrowed down. We cannot expect a revolution in 
the foundations of the Standard Model without “the ongoing, unfailing, and indefatigable efforts of 
experimentalists at places like Cern”. On the other hand, Hossenfelder (2020) challenges the 
centrality of the FCC for the future of physics and science in general by arguing that the money has 
better uses, given climate change and pandemics. Hossenfelder also discusses a crucial but 
unknown causal factor that needs to be taken into account when scenarios are examined, the 
properties of the targets of research: “But there is no reason why the particles that make up dark 
matter or dark energy should show up in the new device’s energy range. And that is assuming they 
are particles to begin with, for which there no evidence. Even if they are particles, moreover, highly 
energetic collisions may not be the best way to look for them. Weakly interacting particles with tiny 
masses, for example, are not something one looks for with large colliders.” 
The discussion in the example of the Kuhnian structure also shows how the worries in §2 that 
nothing can be said about the future of science or that the estimating leads to wishful thinking and 
external control of science are exaggerated. The example illustrates that there can be reasonable 
discussions about possible futures of science, based on what we have learned about the 
development of science, and that the reasonable discussion does not threaten the openness of the 
paths in scientific development. 
(E2) To balance the revolution-centered Kuhnian structure, it is possible to choose theories with 
different tenets as the theoretical basis of a structural taxonomy. For example, consider structural 
realism which says that the structural or mathematical contents of successful theories are preserved 
through theory change (Worrall 1989; see discussion in Frigg & Votsis 2011). There may not be 
ontological continuities, as Laudan (1981) argued (see also §2), but there are structural continuities. 
Given the structural realism, we are able to build scenarios where disconnection-inducing 
revolutions do not dominate the landscape of theory change. A structural realist’s taxonomy would 





A notable implication of the structural realism taxonomy is that it can provide clear scenarios only 
when we track paths of successful science.5 Although this might appear as a serious limitation, there 
are considerations that support the focus on successful science. First, it is easy to create an 
unsuccessful science. There are too many scenarios where a science without success exists. One can 
take current successful theories and add nonsense to them, or one can create a whole new theory 
consisting of nothing but nonsense. However, such scenarios are of interest only in special cases. 
Usually, we are interested in understanding the future of science on the assumption that science 
remains at least as successful as it is now. Secondly, the focus on successful science enables to 
describe the boundaries of change in the future of science: at least in the case of successful theories, 
 
5 Structural realism is also restricted to rather formal sciences and seems to leave out less formal ones (Frigg & Votsis 
2011, 269). I return to the consequences of such limitations in the next section. 
the structural features may not be completely abandoned in the future. As said, the structural-
realism taxonomy balances the overall revolution-centeredness of the Kuhnian taxonomy.  
Indeed, different taxonomies are at their best in providing information about possible futures of 
science when they are used side-by-side. For example, some scenarios in the Kuhnian and 
structural-realism taxonomies differ with respect to the continuity in the scientific development. 
Such differences enable us to be aware of the consequences of our theoretical commitments. 
However, some scenarios in the Kuhnian and structural-realism taxonomies are rather similar. For 
example, in both taxonomies. there are scenarios where theoretical change without theoretical 
continuity happens. Such similarities enable us to understand repeatable patterns across different 
theoretical commitments. 
(E3) A structural taxonomy does not have to be based on the kinds of macro-principles of scientific 
development that the Kuhnian taxonomy exemplifies. For example, in an interesting study, 
Bedessem and Ruphy propose “three epistemological conditions that influence the occurrence of the 
unexpected in the course of a scientific inquiry” (2019, 1). The study enhances understanding and 
especially challenges conventional thinking according to which “a research whose agenda is set 
according to external considerations is less hospitable to the full flourishing of the unexpected than 
a research whose agenda is freely set internally by scientists” (ibid.) Bedessems and Ruphy’s study 
is interesting from the perspective of the estimating of the future of science also because it confirms 
that, while we are unable to predict future inventions or discoveries, we can still say interesting 
things about the processes or structures surrounding the inventions and discoveries.  
The three epistemological conditions that influence the occurrence of the unexpected are the 
following:  
(i) Leeway for the manifestation of uncontrolled factors: “Unknown causal pathways existing in the 
real world are thus inoperative (or less operative) in highly controlled laboratory conditions, thereby 
limiting the occurrence of unexpected results. Inversely, a low degree of isolation and control favors 
the manifestation of unknown causal pathways, hence the occurrence of unexpected results”. (Ibid, 
2.) 
(ii) Diversity of objects under study and of experimental approaches: “[M]ultiplying the types of 
objects and the types of experimental approaches used to study them increases the probability that 
some uncontrolled factors intervene and that some unknown causal pathways become manifest.” 
(Ibid, 2.) 
(iii) Hegemony and plasticity of the theoretical background: “[W]ell-established theoretical 
framework may hinder the occurrence of the unexpected when it is in a hegemonic, monopolistic 
position, that is, when it constitutes the dominant theoretical framework of inquiry in a given field 
(ibid.). 
Bedessem and Ruphy argue (2019, §5) that importation of exogenous problems that “incorporate 
interests and needs external [--] to scientific communities” may actually favor the occurrence of the 
unexpected. We can formulate the following taxonomy on the basis of these insights. 
 
Figure 3 
This simplified taxonomy provides information about many scenarios concerning the occurrence of 
unexpected results. It tells us in what kinds of situations unexpected results can occur and what 
makes them unlikely. Most importantly, the taxonomy encodes the main insight of Bedessem and 
Ruphy’s study by making explicit that the occurrence of unexpected results can occur both in 
endogenous and exogenous problem situations. In this way, we can recognize repeatable patterns in 
seemingly different phenomena within a single taxonomy (whereas (E2) showed how such patterns 
can be found across taxonomies). 
I conclude this section by noting that the impossibility of predicting the future results of science 
does not mean that we cannot say anything interesting about the possible futures of science. On the 
contrary, by focusing on the dynamics and boundaries of scientific development, analyzed by the 
philosophy of science and related fields, we can draw extremely nuanced pictures of possible 
futures of science in different scales. We can enhance understanding and challenge conventional 
thinking by building taxonomies of possible futures of science. However, we have to be careful here 
and take some critical distance from the taxonomies. We need to ask how the merits of a taxonomy 
are to be judged. 
4. Assessing the Merits of a Structural Taxonomy 
In this section, I argue that there are at least four sets of considerations that are relevant in assessing 
the credibility and usefulness of a structural taxonomy. In addition to explicating how the merits of 
a taxonomy can be assessed, I also point out that there are interesting connections between the 
different sets of considerations which sheds new light on the nature, prospects, and limits of 
philosophical theories of science. 
(I) Historical considerations. A straightforward way to assess the merits of a taxonomy is to ask 
how warranted the base-theory is. A good theory must be supported by the history and current state 
of science. There is, however, the serious problem that it is difficult to tell how philosophical 
theories could be tested against the history of science.6 Bolinska and Martin (2020) have 
summarized the discussion in terms of methodological and metaphysical objections to the use of 
case studies in support of philosophical theories. “Methodological objections claim that historical 
accounts and their uses by philosophers are subject to various biases. [--] Metaphysical objections, 
on the other hand, claim that historical case studies are intrinsically unsuited to serve as evidence 
for philosophical claims, even when carefully constructed and used.” (Ibid, 37). 
There are four methodological objections. According to construction bias, historical accounts are 
theory-laden, and “it is always possible to construct alternative narratives for a given historical 
episode” (ibid, 38). According to selection bias, philosophers can cherry-pick those historical 
episodes that support their case (ibid, 38-39). According to interpretation bias, “not only might our 
 
6 See Donovan et al. (1988); Pitt (2001), Schickore (2011), Kinzel (2015); JPH 12 (2) (2018). 
theoretical commitments bias the construction and selection of case studies; they can also affect 
how case studies are interpreted (ibid, 39). According to application bias, “[e]ven if we agree on 
the facts about historical cases and how to interpret them, we might still disagree about what we 
ought to conclude on that basis” (ibid, 39). 
Bolinska and Martin argue, convincingly, that the possible biases do not make it impossible to 
adjudicate between different philosophical theories on the basis of historical considerations. Of 
course, it is impossible to find the philosophical theory that is confirmed by the historical evidence, 
but this does not mean that the relative strengths of different philosophical theories and historical 
interpretations cannot be assessed. Moreover, Bolinska and Martin argue that “[h]istory, 
philosophy, and indeed most academic disciplines rely on careful, critical analysis to answer 
difficult questions, even if a firm answer is not immediately forthcoming” and that “whatever stand 
we take, we should admit its fallibility” (ibid, 40) 
We should also notice that the seriousness of methodological limitations depends on the goal of our 
research. If we want to know how science really works, the methodological problems seriously 
injure the prospects of successful research. However, if our goal is to enhance understanding and 
challenge conventional thinking (see §2), then we can settle for something less. Given that different 
structural taxonomies are intended to be used together to map the possible futures of science, we do 
not have to make the dubious choice of only one base-theory on the basis of historical and factual 
considerations. Rather, we can rank the credibility of the base-theories on the basis of what we 
currently know about the history of science and prefer some theory over others. However, the 
alternatives that are ranked lower are not lost from sight in the process. Rather, they show – literally 
– what future options the preferred taxonomy might miss.  
The metaphysical problems are Heraclitianism and contingency. According to Heraclitianism, 
“[s]cientific concepts, experimental methods and standards, and even the notion of science itself 
shift from one historical moment to another (ibid, 40). The historical particularities resist 
philosophical generalization. According to contingency, “[b]ecause history is not governed by strict, 
deterministic rules [--], it might in some meaningful sense have gone differently. Because history 
might have gone otherwise, we have ample reason to doubt whether historical examples can 
constitute firm evidence for philosophical claims that seek to generalize about scientific practice 
and process”. (Ibid, 41.) 
Bolinska and Martin suggest, correctly it seems, that the metaphysical objections can be addressed 
by finding a suitable type of contingency in history. The basic idea is that if a historical outcome is 
contingent upon a set of factors, then those factors explain the outcome (Ibid, 42-43). This in line 
with the counterfactual approach to causal explanation (e.g. Woodward 2003); if Y would not have 
been the case, had X not been the case, then X explains Y.7 Given that a philosophical theory 
incorporates the set of factors that the historical outcome depended on, the philosophical theory is 
supported by its ability to explain the outcome. The variability and contingency of history do not 
pose any problems to the philosophical theories as long as the theories can account for the 
variability and contingency.  
In general, it is not despite but because of the invariability and contingency of history that 
philosophical theories that make sense of historical processes are powerful tools to build scenarios 
of the future of science. We need to understand different types of changes that might occur in the 
future and we need to be able to tell upon what factors those changes will depend. Philosophical 
theories that make sense of historical variability and contingency are well suited as the bases of 
 
7 Of course, we have to specify how X was supposed to change in order to avoid technical problems, but that is not our 
business in this paper. 
structural taxonomies precisely because of the conceptual similarities between historical 
contingencies and future possibilities. 
Given the observations above concerning the methodological and metaphysical problems in using 
historical evidence in the philosophy of science, there is no serious obstacle in using historical 
considerations in the assessment of philosophical theories that serve as the bases of structural 
taxonomies, given that we follow good methodological practice and explanatory reasoning. As long 
as we have philosophy of science that makes sense of the history of science, we can assess the 
merits of a structural taxonomy by assessing how warranted its base-theory is in the light of up-to-
date knowledge in the field. The estimating of possible futures of science is under epistemic control 
as long as the philosophy of science is. 
(II) Normative considerations. When we estimate the future, we are not only interested in what 
could happen but what should happen. As noted in §2, the futures research is also interested in 
preferable and desirable futures. Given this, we are often eager to make suggestions about epistemic 
and institutional principles that could improve science (let’s call these “normative principles” for 
the sake of clarity). In fact, such suggestions seem essential for the fruitful development of science. 
However, such principles often describe, explicitly, activities and institutional arrangements that 
cannot be found in history. If we suggest a structural taxonomy that has as its base-theory a 
normative principle, there often are not direct historical considerations that bear on the credibility of 
the principle. How to evaluate the merits of such taxonomy? 
I suggest that the merits of a normative principle can be tested by rationally reconstructing historical 
episodes in accordance with the principle. The idea of rational reconstructions goes back to Lakatos 
(1971) who suggested that we can evaluate philosophical theories of science by asking how well 
they enable one to reconstruct the history of science as a rational development. Basically, we have 
to provide an account of how the history of science would have been, had it developed in 
accordance with a philosophical theory, and then measure the distance between the would-have-
been history and the actual history. In essence, we have to study counterfactual developments. This 
connects rational reconstructions with more direct historical considerations. As we saw above, a 
philosophical theory that suggests that the factors F explain some development of science is 
supported by the history of science if it is the case that, had F not existed, the outcome O would 
have been different. Analogously, in a rational reconstruction, we study what would have happened, 
had some other set of factors F* existed in the past. If F* would also have produced O or some 
better outcome than O, the philosophical theory incorporating F* is supported.  
The basic question we need to ask when assessing a normative principle is whether we should have 
adopted it in the past. If so, then it could provide us with an insightful structural taxonomy. In this 
way, we can use historical considerations to assess normative principles. Notice that normative 
principles do not have to be novel suggestions. Theories that have been abandoned because they do 
not account for the factors that have actually shaped the development of science can sometimes be 
revitalized as normative theories8 – as long as they suggest that some course of action or 
organization would have led to a preferable outcome. 
The first two ways of assessing the merits of a structural taxonomy told how historical support is 
relevant for the merits. The next two will focus on the features of taxonomies themselves but they 
also provide a feedback loop back to our understanding of the historical virtues of the base-theories. 
(III) Usefulness of a taxonomy. The more scenarios a taxonomy incorporates and the more definite 
the scenarios are, the better the taxonomy. An insightful taxonomy provides unambiguous scenarios 
 
8 This sometimes happen when scientist themselves adopt a philosophical position, such as falsificationism. 
when more contents are added to its structure. A fault spot of a taxonomy is a scenario that is 
dubious, incoherent, or ambiguous, and taxonomies should avoid fault spots.  
For example, in the Kuhnian taxonomy, there was the ambiguity whether scenarios2, where the FFC 
is not built, are scenarios of revolution or not. Moreover, the taxonomy incorporates two scenarios 
of revolution with rather different causal structures. In the scenario (1,1), a revolution occurs 
because certain problems cannot be solved. In the scenario (1,3), a revolution occurs because the 
attempts to solve the problems provide knowledge that can be used to formulate a new theoretical 
frame. Given these fault spot ambiguities, the Kuhnian taxonomy has its weak sides. 
The fault spots in taxonomies suggest topics that require further historical (or conceptual) 
investigation. For example, in order to make the Kuhnian taxonomy more insightful, we have to ask 
detailed questions about the dynamics of the (supposed) revolutions in the history of science.9 In 
this way, future-oriented thinking can open new perspectives and lines of research concerning the 
development of science. Our fault spots in the estimating of the future of science reveal fault spots 
in our understanding of the development and workings of science. 
(IV) The comparison between taxonomies. We can compare different taxonomies with each other in 
order to find disagreements, agreements, fault spots, and blind spots in the taxonomies. A blind spot 
is a scenario that is altogether missing from a taxonomy. We already saw, in the previous section, 
that comparison between taxonomies can provide information about repeatable patterns across 
theoretical backgrounds. Here, it is useful to distinguish between two kinds of taxonomies: (i) 
dominant taxonomies that are well-supported by criteria (I-III) above, and (ii) challenger 
taxonomies that tease out the shortcomings of the dominant taxonomies. Dominant taxonomies 
 
9 I am not suggesting that there have not been refinements to the Kuhnian theory before. Obviously, there have been, 
for example in Toulmin (1970). My suggestion is that the future-oriented analysis can improve this existing practice. I 
also discuss the refinements in the next section as a part of estimating of the future of science. 
support each other when they agree on scenarios and they question each other when they disagree 
on scenarios. A good and insightful dominant taxonomy agrees with many other dominant 
taxonomies. Challenger taxonomies, on the other hand, are good and insightful when they present 
scenarios that are missing from dominant taxonomies. Challenger taxonomies are important in their 
ability to challenge the understanding – conventional or not – embedded in the dominant 
taxonomies. They enable us to better understand the implausible but possible futures that might 
challenge our courses of action concerning the future. 
The comparison between taxonomies also provides feedback for the philosophical theories. Given 
that we can find similarities and differences between the scenarios of different taxonomies, we are 
able to see how similar or different the commitments of two different philosophical theories are or 
how many ambiguities they share. For example, if two seemingly conflicting theories agree in great 
detail on the scenarios they entail, we have to ask what the fundamental difference between the 
theories is supposed to be or how come it does not have many practical consequences. Moreover, 
structural taxonomies can also indicate that some topic is not analyzed enough in the philosophy of 
science in general. A surprising future-related question that we cannot answer should indicate that 
something is missing from the philosophy of science. 
In this section, we have seen how the merits of a structural taxonomy can be assessed. In essence, 
we have no other evidence for the philosophical theories than historical evidence since there 
obviously is no direct evidence of the future. All we can do is to study how science has and could 
have (plausibly) developed. Given that the future might not resemble the past, historical evidence is 
prima facie dubious with respect to the future. Given this, we had to make some modifications to 
the use of historical evidence: First, we do not choose but prefer one philosophical theory over the 
others and therefore keep the wide future possibilities is sight. Secondly, we allow normative 
theories to be used as the base-theory of a structural taxonomy in order to see futures that do not 
follow historical but merely possible (and desirable) principles. Thirdly, once we have found 
dominant taxonomies, we stay aware of unnoticed future possibilities by formulating challenger 
taxonomies. Given these qualifications, we can find historical support for our scenarios of the future 
and, at the same time, avoid drawing straightforward analogies between the future and the past.  
Moreover, we have seen how future-oriented study of science can reveal dubious commitment, 
ambiguities, incoherence, and ignored topics in the philosophy of science. In this way, the future-
oriented philosophy of science can enhance our current understanding of the present science and its 
development. Future-oriented thinking is a great tool for our research now, not merely in the future. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that deep theoretical analyses of possible futures of science are missing. 
Despite the important questions regarding the future of science, the impossibility of predicting and 
dangers in controlling the future of science have made the philosophy of science skeptical towards 
the prospects of estimating of possible futures of science. Due to this, conceptual tools to estimate 
the future of science are missing from the repertoire of the futures research. In this paper, I 
challenged this state of affairs. In §2, I argued that the philosophy of science has, due to its nature, 
good prospects of achieving the central objectives of the research, enhancing understanding and 
challenging conventional thinking. In Section3, I went through arguments that establish the 
impossibility of predicting future innovations and discoveries and argued that such predictions do 
not exhaust interesting future concerns. I argued that we can formulate scenarios of the future of 
science by using philosophical theories of science. By adding contents (describing the possible 
adoption of some knowledge, methods, or institutional arrangements) to the general structures 
outlined by philosophical theories, we can achieve rich taxonomy of scenarios of the future of 
science. By creating scenarios of the future of science, the taxonomies enhance understanding and 
challenge conventional thinking. In §4, I argued that the merits of the taxonomies can be rationally 
assessed and, therefore, we can critically estimate the possible futures of science. 
The theoretical plurality and disagreements in the philosophy of science can be turned into a 
resource in the estimating of futures of science. The plurality enables us to (i) formulate many 
taxonomies and thereby exhaust a wider space of possibilities, (ii) compare different taxonomies to 
find repeatable patterns across theoretical commitments, (iii) provide different interpretations of a 
node in a taxonomy (e.g. different views on the dynamics of revolutionary change in science 
interpret different nodes as revolution-constituting), and (iv) formulate challenger taxonomies that 
challenge the received views. While the philosophers of science do not agree on many things, it is 
clear that the philosophy of science, as a whole, has deeply enhanced our understanding and shown 
many weaknesses in the conventional ways of thinking about science. The prospects of estimating 
the future of science serve as a measure of the often hidden or questioned progress in the 
philosophy of science. 
Moreover, we saw in §4 that future-oriented thinking can open new perspectives on the existing 
philosophical issues and even point out ignored topics in the philosophy of science. While the 
differences between theories cannot be reduced to their future consequences, asking future-oriented 
questions helps to improve the current understanding of science. By approaching the possible 
futures of science, we open a whole new perspective on the philosophy of science. 
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